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COMMENTS
Default Judgments in Social Security
Claims Litigation
Default judgments are not favored.1 The preferred approach
for resolving cases is to have the parties fully and fairly litigate
their claims and defenses.2 This preference, however, can be over-
come by the need to protect a party from extensive delay or disre-
gard of the suit by the opposing party.8 The availability of judg-
ment by default encourages parties to defend claims within the
time limits provided.
Special problems arise when the United States, its agencies, or
its officers are litigants in a civil suit. The government is particu-
larly likely to be slow in its litigation efforts because of its heavy
caseload and bureaucratic structure of decisionmaking.4 These pe-
culiar characteristics make it appropriate for courts to respond dif-
ferently to delay or default by governmental litigants than to delay
by nongovernmental litigants.
Default judgments against the United States are governed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(e), which permits entry of a
default judgment if the government is in default 5 and the plaintiff
' 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2681, at 249-51
(1973). See Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir.
1977) ("Judgments by default are a drastic remedy and should be resorted to only in ex-
treme situations.").
1 See Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970).
3 See, e.g., H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689,
691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citations omitted):
[Tihe default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary
process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. In that instance,
the diligent party must be protected lest he be faced with interminable delay and con-
tinued uncertainty as to his rights. The default judgment remedy serves as such a pro-
tection. Furthermore, the possibility of a default is a deterrent to those parties who
choose delay as a part of their litigative strategy.
4 Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980).
8 FED. R. CIrv. P. 55(a) defines default as a failure to plead or otherwise defend.
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establishes his claim by "evidence satisfactory to the court."6 De-
fault judgments against the United States under the Social Secur-
ity Act, however, appear to require a stricter test. In cases brought
by claimants seeking district court review of benefit denials by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services 8 the courts must look to
section 405(g) of Title 42, which requires that the Secretary's find-
ings of fact be affirmed if supported by "substantial evidence."
Section 405(g) makes no provision for claimants to establish their
cases directly to the satisfaction of the courts. 9
The courts are divided over the applicability of section 405(g)
in situations of governmental default. Although a majority apply
the section strictly,10 thereby effectively refusing to punish the
Secretary for inexcusable delays, two circuit courts have invoked
rule 55(e) or analogous provisions of the Federal Rules in support
of a standard of review more favorable to claimants."'
I Id. 55(e) ("No judgment by default shall be entered against the United States or an
officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evi-
dence satisfactory to the court.").
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976).
S The Secretary of Health and Human Services will hereinafter be referred to as the
"Secretary." The Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") inherited the health
and welfare responsibilities of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW").
See 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. IV 1980).
1 The text of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV
1980), reads in relevant part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which
he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such
decision by a civil action .... As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified
copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and
decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the plead-
ings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The
findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive .... The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause
shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by
the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the
Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and
that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a
prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing
such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or its [sic]
decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified find-
ings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon
which his action in modifying or affirming was based. Such additional or modified find-
ings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of
the original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court shall be final ex-
cept that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil
actions.
10 See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
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After reviewing the case law and the alternative approaches,
this comment concludes that section 405(g) provides the exclusive
standard for judicial review and cannot be relaxed merely because
the Secretary is in default. The comment then outlines the appli-
cation of section 405(g) to various situations of governmental de-
fault, assesses the mandamus remedy, and concludes with a propo-
sal for legislative reform that would better balance the
government's interests and claimants' needs for speedy resolution
of benefit disputes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rule 55(e)
The entry of a default judgment against a party in federal dis-
trict court is governed by rule 55.12 Proof of a movant's entitlement
to relief generally is unnecessary or left to the trial court's discre-
tion.18 By relaxing or eliminating the movant's burden of proving
the merits of his substantive claim, rule 55 imposes a harsh forfei-
ture for default.
Rule 55(e),' which governs default judgments against the
United States, imposes a more stringent requirement for obtaining
a default judgment. Under this rule, a moving party must prove
"by evidence satisfactory to the court" his substantive entitlement
to relief against the United States.1 5 The federal courts have enter-
" The entry of default and judgment by default are treated somewhat differently under
rule 55. An entry of default may be entered by the clerk against a party who has "failed to
plead or otherwise defend." FED. R. Cxv. P. 55(a). Judgment by default is entered by the
clerk only when the plaintiff submits an affidavit of a "sum certain or for a sum which can
by computation be made certain" and default has been entered against a defendant who has
failed to appear. Id. 55(b)(1). If these circumstances do not apply, judgment by default may
be entered only by the court, not by the clerk. Id. 55(b)(2). Rule 55(c) provides that an
entry of default may be set aside by the court for "good cause." A default judgment may
also be set aside under rule 60(b), which provides for relief from a judgment or order. See
Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980) (distinguishing between
an "entry of default" against the United States under rule 55(a) for a failure to plead, and a
"default judgment[]" under rule 55(e)).
IS See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 1073, 1087 (1966).
14 See supra note 6. Rule 55(e) is derived from a similar provision in a former section of
the Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 6, 24 Stat. 505, 506 (1887) (repealed 1948), which provided that
the plaintiff could not prevail against the United States unless he established his claim by
"proof satisfactory to the court."
" To secure a default judgment against the United States a plaintiff must also estab-
lish service on the government, see, e.g., Fedor v. Ribicoff, 211 F. Supp. 520, 520 (E.D. Pa.
1962); waiver of sovereign immunity, see, e.g., id.; and subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g.,
Carignan v. United States, 48 F.R.D. 323, 325, 328 (D. Mass. 1969), an action by a prisoner
against the United States and unnamed agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
recovery of personal property. Default was entered after the United States failed to plead.
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tained motions for default judgments against a variety of federal
agencies and administrators under this rule.16
B. Section 405(g)
Under section 405(g) of Title 42,17 claimants who are denied
Social Security benefits by the Secretary may seek review in fed-
eral district court.I" This jurisdictional grant vests a district court
with "power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the
record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision
of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. 9"
After a rule 55(e) hearing, the court denied the government's motion to remove the entry of
default but granted its motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that
jurisdiction is a prerequisite to any judicial action other than dismissal of a complaint. See
also Burton v. Peartree, 326 F. Supp. 755, 759-61 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
The stricter standard of rule 55(e) "arose from recognition that the government was
sometimes slow to respond to a complaint and that the public fisc should be protected
against payment of unfounded claims solely because of a failure to respond timely."
Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnote and citation omit-
ted). See also Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611 (1949) (dictum) ("Rule 55(e)
expressly bars all judgments against the United States without proof. . . ."); United States
v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 853-54 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Geisler, 174 F.2d 992,
999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 861 (1949); Turner v. Department of Army, 447 F.
Supp. 1207, 1213 n.22 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 593 F.2d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
18 E.g., Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying rule in federal
employee's suit challenging validity of Federal Employees Early Retirement Act); United
States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 853 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying rule in IRS action against
taxpayer when IRS failed timely to answer counterclaim); United States v. Geisler, 174 F.2d
992, 999 (7th Cir.) (applying rule in denaturalization proceedings), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
861 (1949); Turner v. Department of Army, 447 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 n.22 (D.D.C. 1978)
(applying rule in action by former Army chaplain asking court to revise his military service
record), aff'd mem., 593 F.2d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Knouff v. United States, 74
F.R.D. 555, 556-57 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Zulli, 418 F. Supp. 252, 253 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Greenbaum v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Burton v. Pear-
tree, 326 F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
11 See supra note 9.
is Judicial review directly affects only about one beneficiary in 3,000; only one benefi-
ciary out of 9,000 is granted benefits as a result of judicial review. E. YOURMAN, REPORT ON A
STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS, APPEALs, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, reprinted in SUBCOMM.
ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECENT
STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISAmLrrY HEARINGS AND APPEALs CRISIS 125, 160-61 (Comm.
Print 1975). About 8,000 to 10,000 new cases are filed in federal district court each year
regarding disability benefits alone. Hearings on H.R. 3236 and 3464 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1979) (statement of Commissioner of Social
Security Stanford G. Ross).
19 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 9. If new evidence is submitted to
the court, the appropriate disposition will usually be to remand to the Secretary for a fur-
ther hearing. See, e.g., King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979) (remand is appro-
priate "when new evidence is submitted to a reviewing court if the court concludes that the
Secretary's decision might reasonably have been different had that evidence been before
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Section 405(g) also provides the standard for reviewing denials
of benefit claims: the Secretary's findings "as to any fact, if sup-
ported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 20 Substantial
evidence has been defined as " 'such relevant evidence as a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' 21
Findings of fact include inferences supported by substantial evi-
dence;22 the court on review must consider the record as a whole,
including the pleadings and a transcript of the administrative re-
cord.23 Although the reviewing court may believe that the evidence
supports the claimant, it must uphold the Secretary if substantial
evidence supports his factual findings.24
Section 405(h)2' makes the jurisdictional and evidentiary pro-
visions of section 405(g) exclusive. Under section 405(h), jurisdic-
tion over factual issues in claims denials may not be grounded on
general federal question jurisdiction2 s or on the jurisdictional pro-
him when his decision was rendered").
2" 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
1 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
'2 Cody v. Ribicoff, 289 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1961); Carqueville v. Flemming, 263 F.2d
875, 877 (7th Cir. 1959); Folsom v. O'Neal, 250 F.2d 946, 947 (10th Cir. 1957).
2s Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978) ("We may not focus and base
our decision entirely on a single piece of evidence, and disregard other pertinent evidence.");
Russell v. Secretary of HEW, 540 F.2d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 1976) ("This court is not free to
overturn the Secretary's decision on the basis of weight and credibility of evidence where
the decision has been based on the record as a whole.").
24 Estep v. Richardson, 459 F.2d 1015, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1972) (section 405(g) "pre-
cludes a reviewing court from deciding a claim on its own independent findings"). Accord,
Laffoon v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977); Lightcap v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp.
209, 213 (W.D. Pa. 1962). See also Russell v. Secretary of HEW, 540 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir.
1976).
5 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(h) (West Supp. 1982) provides in full:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all
individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the
Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on
any claim arising under this subchapter.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980). See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), a
class action brought to challenge a Social Security requirement that the claimant must have
been married to the wage earner nine months before his death to receive insurance benefits.
The district court had read the last sentence of section 405(h) as "no more than a codifica-
tion of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies," and found jurisdiction under
section 1331. Id. at 757. The Supreme Court held that section 405(h) requires more, as "is
plain from its own language, which is sweeping and direct and which states plainly that no
action shall be brought under § 1331." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court held that sec-
tion 405 provides both standing and the substantive test on review. Id. at 760-61. One dis-
sent, arguing that there was jurisdiction under section 1331 because the complaint included
constitutional issues, stated that "[s]ection 405(h) . . .only bans, except under § 405(g),
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vision of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 7 In Califano v. Sanders,8
the Supreme Court held that section 405(h) also precludes jurisdic-
tion under the Administrative Procedure Act.29 Section 405(h) pro-
vides further that "[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Secretary
shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency
except as herein provided." 0 The standard of review is located in
section 405(g): the substantial evidence standard.31
C. Delay in Claims Litigation
Although a claimant whose bid for Social Security benefits is
denied by the Secretary may recoup delayed benefit payments if
he successfully appeals the denial, 2 this process is lengthy and
may inflict substantial hardship. The Secretary has frequently
been castigated by the courts for delay and inaction in Social Se-
curity suits;33 the claims process has been cited as a "labyrinth,"'"
a "maze, ' 3 5 and "uncomfortably reminiscent of Alice's trip through
Wonderland." '
suits which ... require the application of the statute to a set of facts, and which seek
nothing more than a determination of eligibility claimed to arise under the Act." Id. at 789
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
30 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(h) (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 25.
31 Sections 405(g) and (h) apply only to the Secretary's findings of fact. Thus, when a
claimant's appeal involves a constitutional challenge, rule 55(e) may apply. Thomas v. Har-
ris, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1628, 1629-30 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
32 Nonpayment during the delay caused by the review process would be an "underpay-
ment," 20 C.F.R. § 404.501 (1981), and the Secretary would pay the balance due to the
claimant, or, if the claimant were deceased, to his surviving spouse or children. 42 U.S.C. §
404(a)(2) (1976). Payments would be made from the date of filing the application or from
the first month all requirements for entitlement were met, up to 12 months before the appli-
cation, whichever was earlier. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.501, 404.621 (1981). See Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 523 F.2d 689, 704 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Congress intended that Social Security benefi-
ciaries receive the full and correct amount of their entitlement, even if this requires
payments to be made long after the period of entitlement.") (footnote omitted).
3 See, e.g., Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1195 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1980) ("poor
and disabled persons ... suffer because of the 'glacial pace' at which HEW conducts its
administrative disability proceedings") (citation omitted); Carroll v. Secretary of HEW, 470
F.2d 252, 253 (5th Cir. 1972); Santiago v. Secretary of HEW, 82 F.R.D. 164, 166 (D.P.R.
1979) (condemning the "Secretary's systematic record of flagrant disobedience to judicial
authority and obstinate abuse of this court's leniency"), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044 (1st Cir. 1980).
Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1980).
Carroll v. Secretary of HEW, 470 F.2d 252, 253 (5th Cir. 1972).
" Id. See also Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1195 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980) ("HEW
has been almost singly responsible for the development of the jurisprudence of rule 55(e).").
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In addition to the "glacial pace"87 common in all governmental
litigation, 8 the benefit appeals process is particularly drawn out
because of section 405(g)'s requirement that the Secretary file with
his answer a certified copy of the transcript of the administrative
record.39 The record is not transcribed until judicial review is
sought by a claimant, and transcription, which requires playing a
tape and identifying voices, is an "inherently slow" process.' 0 After
transcription, the record is reviewed by the Department of Health
and Human Services to decide whether to resist the claimant. If
the decision is affirmative, the Department of Justice is then in-
structed to file an answer for the Secretary.41 Although the answer
must be filed within sixty days of a claimant's complaint,42 the
process of transcription and review frequently results in the Secre-
tary's default.
II. ANALYSIS
The Secretary may default in several ways: he may file noth-
ing;' 3 he may file a motion to postpone;" or he may file an answer
and transcript without a brief or supporting memorandum of law.'5
Section 405(g) commands the Secretary to file a copy of the record
as part of his answer 4 and requires the reviewing court to base its
decision on review of the record.'7 A problem arises, however, when
section 405(g)'s requirement of substantial evidence in the record
37 Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1195 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 1194 n.8.
' 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 9.
40 Villines v. Harris, 487 F. Supp. 1278, 1281-82 (D.N.J. 1980).
41 Id.
4' The Act contains no express time limit for filing. It simply requires the Secretary to
file a certified copy of the transcript of the record "[a]s part of his answer." 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980). However, FD. R. Civ. P. 12(a) provides that "[t]he United States
or an officer or agency thereof shall serve an answer to the complaint ... within 60 days
after the service upon the United States attorney of the pleading in which the claim is
asserted." See also Villines v. Harris, 487 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D.N.J. 1980).
4 Cf. Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1, 87-89 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (United States did not
appear or file a responsive pleading), modified sub nom. California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340
(9th Cir. 1961), aff'd sub noma. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). This has apparently
never happened in a Social Security case.
4 See, e.g., Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1979); Howard v. Wein-
berger, 489 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 1974).
4 See, e.g., Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1045 (1st Cir. 1980). Cf.
Bostic v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 686, 688 (S.D.W. Va. 1979) (filing of transcript out of time
allowed; filing of answer precluded).
46 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980) ("As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a
certified copy of the transcript of the record . . .
47 Id. See supra note 9.
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combines with failure by the Secretary to produce a copy of the
record.
A district court confronted with a default by the Secretary
might respond in one of three ways. Invoking rule 55(e), it might
enter a default judgment against the government if the claimant
proves his claim "by evidence satisfactory to the court." Alterna-
tively, it might invoke section 405(g), holding that the substantial
evidence test requires it to await the Secretary's response and then
to review the record for substantial evidence supporting his posi-
tion. Finally, a court might invoke other sanctions against the Sec-
retary for his default. After reviewing the case law, this part con-
siders these alternatives in turn, concluding that review under
section 405(g) is the only permissible route. The part then outlines
a way for the courts to respond to the Secretary when he is in de-
fault that is consistent with section 405(g).
A. The Case Law
A majority of courts, including the Fifth," Sixth,49 and Sev-
enth50 Circuits, have held that the substantial evidence standard of
section 405(g) must be applied on review despite default by the
Secretary, even in cases in which he fails to file an answer or sub-
mit the transcript of the administrative record with his pleading. 1
Acknowledging the general applicability of rule 55(e) in cases of
default by the United States, these courts incorporate the section
405(g) requirement into rule 55(e)'s "evidence satisfactory to the
,8 See, e.g., Howard v. Weinberger, 489 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 1974) (default judgment
reversed; section 405(g) applies); Carroll v. Secretary of HEW, 470 F.2d 252, 256 (5th Cir.
1972) (default judgment vacated; evidence "satisfactory to the court" must include evidence
sufficient to "conduct review in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)").
4, See, e.g., Poe v. Mathews, 572 F.2d 137, 138 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (default
judgment reversed; a "claim or right to relief" under rule 55(e) requires review of the record
under section 405(g)).
50 See, e.g., Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1979) (default judgment
vacated; "right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court" can be established only by a
showing in accordance with section 405(g) that the Secretary's decision is not "supported by
substantial evidence").
1 See also Johnson v. Harris, 512 F. Supp. 339, 342-44, 349 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (whether
styled summary or default judgment, plaintiff entitled to judgment if under section 405(g)
the Secretary's decision is not supported by substantial evidence); Villines v. Harris, 487 F.
Supp. 1278, 1281 (D.N.J. 1980) (court may not ignore the statutory command that the tran-
script of the administrative hearing be filed "as part of the answer," and therefore had "no
course but to allow the answer, including the transcript which is part of it, to be filed" late);
Bostic v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 686, 687, 692-93 (S.D.W. Va. 1979) (default judgment granted
after review of the record; in cases involving rule 55(e) and section 405(g) the standard of
evidence "is that of the statute").
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court" standard.
Williams v. CalifanoH is typical. In that case, the Secretary's
answer was not timely filed because of delay in preparing the ad-
ministrative record. The district judge denied a request for an ex-
tension of time, finding that the delay was due to inexcusable neg-
lect. By the time of the hearing on the plaintiff's default judgment
motion, the Secretary had submitted a transcript. The district
court, however, did not consider itself bound by the administrative
record; it found evidence sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim
and entered default judgment under rule 55(e)."
The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment, pointing to two er-
rors." First, the district judge had conducted a de novo review,
had not given any weight to the determination of the administra-
tive law judge, and had not confined himself to the evidence
presented at the administrative hearing. Second, the district judge
had looked for evidence sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim
rather than for evidence sufficient to support the Secretary. The
Seventh Circuit held that, in "considering the interaction of
§ 405(g) and Rule 55(e)," default judgment cannot be entered
without consideration of the record.55 If the reviewing court deter-
mines that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting
the Secretary, it must hold in his favor."
Two circuits have departed from this approach. In Alameda v.
Secretary of HEW,57 the First Circuit vacated a default judgment
entered by the district court" when the Secretary failed to file
a brief. In remanding, the First Circuit stated that "so long as
§ 405(g) has any force, claimant can 'establish his claim' only by
showing that there is no 'substantial evidence' supporting the Sec-
retary." 59 After balancing several "legitimate interests,"60 however,
the First Circuit held that when the Secretary fails to file a brief,
the reviewing court need not "comb the record for substantial evi-
53 593 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1979).
6 Id. at 284.
Id. at 284-85.
"Id.
"Id.
57 622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980).
" Santiago v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F. Supp. 759, 760 (D.P.R.), motion to vacate
denied, 82 F.R.D. 164 (D.P.R. 1979).
622 F.2d at 1048 (citation omitted).
"Id. at 1047. The court considered the need to process Social Security claims quickly,
the plaintiff's statutory burden of proof, the court's interest in the functioning of the adver-
sary system, and the taxpayers' interest in avoiding windfalls to individual litigants. Id. at
1047, 1049.
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dence with which to uphold the administrative decision. ' In-
stead, it can undertake the more "relaxed review contemplated by
Rule 55(e)," relying on the claimant's brief to identify a lack of
sufficient evidence in the record to support the Secretary's conclu-
sion. 2 When the Secretary fails to file a brief, "the quantum and
quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be less than
[that] normally required" under section 405(g).6 s Strict adherence
to section 405(g), the court emphasized, would undermine the
"meaning" and "purpose" of rule 55(e)."
The Ninth Circuit rejected the section 405(g) substantial evi-
dence standard in Giampaoli v. Califano."5 In that case, the dis-
trict court found the claimant had met her burden of proving that
she was unable to perform her former jobs but held the Secretary
had not met his burden of demonstrating that she could perform
other jobs.66 The district court remanded for further administra-
tive proceedings; when none was forthcoming, the court entered
judgment for the claimant.6
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an opinion that did not invoke
section 405(g).68 The court relaxed the evidentiary standard even
further by restricting the scope of rule 55(e). It styled its decision
as a judgment on the merits-not as a default judgment69-- and
held that "rule 55(e) [and its "evidence satisfactory to the court"
standard] does not apply once the plaintiff has presented a prima
facie case and thereby shifted the burden of proof to the govern-
ment."70 The court construed rule 55(e) narrowly, holding that it
61 Id. at 1047.
62 Id. at 1048-49.
" Id. at 1048.
Id.
66 628 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980).
"Id. at 1192. The burden of proof in a disability hearing is bifurcated. See Annot., 22
A.L.R.3d 440, 445 (1968), describing the burden of proof as requiring the claimant to show
a medically determinable physical disability which prevents him from engaging in his
past occupation [and] evidence that he has no training or experience for any other type
of work. The burden is then generally held to shift to the Secretary to show that the
claimant can engage in some substantial gainful employment, and the availability of
any such employment.
67 628 F.2d at 1193.
68 Id. at 1196.
49 Id.
70 Id. at 1195-96. The court distinguished this case from Carroll v. Secretary of HEW,
470 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1972). In Carroll, the district court remanded to the Secretary for
further factual findings as to the claimant's date of birth. When the Secretary failed to file
the supplemental transcript on time, the court entered a default judgment for the claimant.
Id. at 254. The Fifth Circuit held that the remand to the Secretary indicated that the dis-
trict court was not satisfied that there was enough evidence in the record supporting the
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applies only to cases in which the government fails to respond to a
complaint.71
Both the First Circuit in Alameda72 and the Ninth Circuit in
Giampaoli7s emphasized that rule 55(e)'s limitation on default
judgments does not relieve the government of its duty to obey
court orders. They justified this emphasis by analogizing to cases
in which sanctions having the effect of a default judgment are im-
posed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)7 4 for failure
to comply with discovery orders.75 The imposition of rule 37 sanc-
claimant, and that judgment for the claimant was therefore precluded. Id. at 256. In
Giampaoli, the court accepted the Fifth Circuit's characterization of Carroll and distin-
guished the case at hand on the ground that the plaintiff "has done all that she was required
to do." 628 F.2d at 1195 n.11.
1' Id. at 1193-94. According to the court, a narrow construction of rule 55(e) is prefera-
ble because the rule "puts the government in a privileged position above all other litigants.
If this privilege is interpreted too broadly, the government obtains an undue advantage,
which enhances its strategic position and upsets the overriding policy that civil litigants
receive equal treatment." Id. at 1195. Limiting the protection of rule 55(e) to cases involving
the government's failure to respond to a claimant, however, is unnecessarily extreme. De-
fault judgments are entered against the government for reasons other than failure to answer
a complaint; for example, one of the sanctions available for failure to comply with discovery
orders is a judgment by default. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); infra note 74. The language
of rule 55(e) would appear to apply to such cases, regardless of whether the government has
answered the complaint.
72 622 F.2d 1044, 1048 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1980).
73 628 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980).
7' FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) provides that where a party
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. . . the court in which the action
is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for purposes of the action in accor-
dance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.
'1 On the use of the rule 37(b)(2) sanction against the government, see 6 J. MooRE,
F!DERAL PRACTICE 1 55.12 (2d ed. 1972); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MMLLER, supra note 1, § 2702;
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAav. L. REV. 940, 988-89 (1961). In Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979),
the Second Circuit vacated a contempt order issued against the United States Attorney
General for failure to release files to the plaintiffs, but remanded for the district court to
consider the imposition of issue-related sanctions, which would put the plaintiffs in the
same position they would have been in if the files had been disclosed. Id. at 65-67. The court
stated that a partial default judgment, such as one on particular issues of fact, can be en-
tered against the United States despite the provisions of rule 55(e). Id. at 66 n.15. See also
United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1980) (rule
55(e) does not immunize government from rule 37(b) order precluding government from
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tions, such as an order establishing facts in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order 7 6 does not require a rule
55(e) showing, even though the effect is similar to a default
judgment.
The circuits are therefore in sharp disagreement over the ap-
plication of section 405(g)'s substantial evidence requirement to
situations of governmental default. Under the majority approach,
the courts must always review the record for substantial evidence
in favor of the Secretary, even where he is in default; accordingly,
resolution must be delayed until he produces the record. Under the
First Circuit's test, the courts can apply a "relaxed review" when
the Secretary is in default. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach,
the courts can simply accept a claimant's assertions as fact and
enter a judgment on the merits, at least where he has made out a
prima facie case.
B. Rule 55(e) vs. Section 405(g)
It might be argued that Congress did not consider the problem
of default judgments when it enacted section 405(g) and that the
rule 55(e) standard should therefore be incorporated into the So-
presenting evidence on issue of damages; sanction imposed for failure to comply with dis-
covery order); Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951) (facts can be
taken as established against the government when it refuses to produce documents), rev'd
on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 368 (N.D. Ala. 1976)
(dismissal of defendant's petition due to willful failure to respond within proper time to the
plaintiff's request for production of documents was not a default judgment requiring a rule
55(e) showing), petition denied sub nom. Falkowski v. Perry, 464 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ala.
1978); Kahn v. Secretary of HEW, 53 F.R.D. 241, 245-46 (D. Mass. 1971) (order deeming
facts to be taken as established required no rule 55(e) showing); International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. National Mediation Bd., 314 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D.D.C. 1969) (order striking
Board's evasive answers to interrogatories and granting summary judgment to the plaintiff
not subject to rule 55(e)); Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139, 140 (E.D.N.Y.
1957) (dictum) (government bound to answer requests for admission like any other litigant;
sanctions other than default can be imposed without a rule 55(e) showing). Cf. O'Neill v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (although rule 55(e) does not apply
in admiralty, court adopted policies behind the rule and declined to enter default judgment,
imposing discovery sanctions instead), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alltmont v. United
States, 174 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1949) (per curiam).
78 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990
(3d Cir. 1951) (ordering that facts in plaintiffs' favor on issue of negligence be taken as
established after government failed to produce documents for court inspection), rev'd on
other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Sanctions can also include a prohibition on the use of
certain claims or defenses, FED. R. Cv. P. 37(b)(2)(B); or an order striking pleadings, dis-
missing the action, or rendering default judgment, id. 37(b)(2)(C).
7 When a rule 37 order does take the form of a default judgment under rule
37(b)(2)(C), however, it must satisfy the requirements of rule 55 as well. See United States
v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1980).
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cial Security Act. Although section 405(g) deals with claims ap-
peals in general, rule 55(e) specifically addresses the problem of
governmental default; it is a maxim of statutory construction that
specific statutes take precedence over general statutory provi-
sions.7 8 The courts have read provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure into the Social Security Act in other contexts. For
example, the Act is silent on the procedural time limit within
which the Secretary must file an answer; the courts have incorpo-
rated the sixty-day time limit of rule 12(a). 9
This argument is flawed for several reasons. The general/spe-
cific rule of construction is of little use here, for it can be argued
that rule 55(e) is in fact the general provision, providing the usual
evidentiary standard, while section 405(g) embodies the specific,
"substantial evidence" exception to that standard. Moreover, the
rule 12(a) analogy is inapposite: the Social Security Act contains
no time provision, but it does contain a provision governing evi-
dentiary review of the record. In addition, section 405(h) makes
the substantial evidence standard exclusive,80 and a rule permit-
ting a claimant to prove his claim by presenting evidence satisfac-
tory to the court directly conflicts with this command. In the So-
cial Security context the district court does not act in its usual
factfinding role, but sits as an appellate tribunal to review the re-
cord before it.
If rule 55(e) applied in terms, the court could review for evi-
dence satisfactory to it if the Secretary defaulted through failure to
file a brief, even if the administrative record were available."1 Such
a rule seems to be in direct conflict with section 405(g), requiring
review of the record. Where the Secretary failed to file a transcript
of the record, the rule 55(e) argument is stronger. Rather than con-
tinuing to grant the Secretary's motions to extend, the court, una-
ble to evaluate the record, might grant a default judgment based
on evidence presented by the claimant.
Such an application of rule 55(e), however, still appears to
conflict with section 405(h), which limits review to the standard
78 See IA C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.16, at
248 (4th ed. 1972) ("A general statute applies to all persons and localities within its jurisdic-
tional scope, prescribing the governing law upon the subject it encompasses, unless a special
statute exists to treat a refinement of the subject with particularity or to prescribe a differ-
ent law for a particular locality.") (footnote omitted).
79 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
s8 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
s See Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044 (lst Cir. 1980).
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defined in section 405(g). 2 Section 405(g) requires an evaluation of
the evidence in the administrative record that supports the deci-
sion of the Secretary. The claimant's burden is to show that the
evidence is not substantial, and he cannot attempt this showing
without the record. Moreover, even if the claimant could reproduce
for the reviewing court the evidence presented at the administra-
tive hearing, the court could not, consistent with section 405(g),
rely on his showing without considering the evidence supporting
the Secretary."8
Judicial efforts to circumvent the strict requirements of sec-
tion 405(g) carry decided equitable overtones,8 and the unfairness
to claimants facing recurrent delays is manifest. Because the
claims situation involves the public fisc, however, the courts must
apply section 405(g) strictly: the Supreme Court has long empha-
sized the duty of courts to observe scrupulously the conditions de-
fined by Congress for granting governmental benefits.8 5 Relaxation
of the substantial evidence standard would impermissibly intrude
on Congress's control over benefit payments. The only way to mesh
rule 55(e) and section 405(g) is to incorporate the substantial evi-
dence showing as the required "evidence satisfactory to the court"
under rule 55(e).
C. Rule 37
The First86 and Ninth87 Circuits have pointed to cases impos-
ing sanctions against the government under rule 37 for failure to
"
2
-See Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282, 284 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (construing Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)); Villines v. Harris, 487 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (D.N.J.
1980).
Compare Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1049 (1st Cir. 1980), a case in
which the transcript was filed but the government failed to submit a required memorandum.
Permitting a "relaxed review" under rule 55, id. at 1048-49, the court stated:
We would not easily set aside the judgment if the entry of default was justified and the
claimant's district court brief and reference to the [administrative] record appeared
relevant, fair and reasonably comprehensive. If the brief should entirely lack these vir-
tues or refer to evidence supporting the Secretary's decision that was clearly "substan-
tial," we would have no choice but to reverse.
Id. at 1049.
84 Compare Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1980); Alameda v.
Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980), both balancing "policies" and "inter-
ests" implicated by the default issue.
85 See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Mer-
rill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477, 480-81 (2d Cir. 1976);
American Training Serv., Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 434 F. Supp. 988, 1001 (D.N.J. 1977).
8' See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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produce in response to discovery requests. Such sanctions can in-
clude an order that designated facts be taken as established in ac-
cordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;88 such an
order can have the effect, though not the form, of a default judg-
ment. In the Social Security context, a court that took as estab-
lished a claimant's factual contentions would arguably avoid the
problems of rule 55(e) and section 405(g); once a fact is accepted,
the burden-of-proof issue is moot.
The discovery sanction analogy is not appropriate in the So-
cial Security context, however. First, a rule 37 sanction in a Social
Security case so clearly has the effect of a default judgment that it
should be limited to its context-violations of discovery orders.89
The Secretary's duty to ifie a transcript of the administrative re-
cord is a pleading requirement and not a matter of discovery.'0
Moreover, adopting the rule 37 analogy would violate the language
of section 405(g). Rule 37 permits a court to take as established a
claimant's designated facts, but section 405(g) requires an exami-
nation of the evidence in the administrative record.
D. Applying Section 405(g)
Once the rule 55(e) and rule 37 options are rejected, a court is
arguably at the mercy of the Secretary. If section 405(g) requires
review based on the administrative record, the court cannot act
until the record is produced. Such an outcome can be criticized as
unjust, unworkable, and as placing the Secretary instead of the
courts in effective control of claims litigation.' 1 There are two re-
sponses to this argument: first, that it is a matter for congressional,
not judicial, resolution;'2 and second, that it does not preclude the
courts from following a course of action that is manageable and
consistent with the Social Security Act. This section outlines such
a course of action.
1. Administrative record unavailable and Secretary does not
intend to defend. If the Secretary altogether fails to respond to a
claimant's complaint, he may be deemed to concede the case. This
situation apparently presents only a conceptual problem. In prac-
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
" One might question the legitimacy, even in the discovery sanction cases, of a court
entering an order that has the effect of a default judgment so as to avoid an established test
for entry of a default judgment.
- 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 9.
91 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
" See infra part Ill.
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tice, the Secretary will request a remand for an additional hearing
if he does not have enough evidence to evaluate the claim,93 or file
for an extension of time if the transcript has not been produced.9
Such actions indicate that the Secretary has not yet decided
whether to contest the claimant's appeal. Once the decision not to
contest the claim has been made, the Secretary should, before he
files an answer, request a remand for computation of benefits.9
Such a motion approximates a confession of error and relieves the
court of the need to decide the case on the merits in accordance
with section 405(g).
2. Administrative record available and Secretary intends to
defend. If the administrative record is available, the court should
decide the case in accordance with the substantial evidence stan-
dard of section 405(g).9 ' Although a brief or other legal memoranda
might be helpful to the court, especially in deciphering the com-
plex medical testimony in disability cases, 97 they are not essential
under the statute. If the Secretary moves to file an answer or a
brief "out of time,""" the court should follow a two-step process in
resolving the request. First, it should decide whether there is "good
reason" for the delay."' If not, the court should deny the motion
and then decide whether there is substantial evidence in the record
supporting the Secretary.100 The broader response of the First Cir-
cuit in Alameda-permitting "relaxed review" of the record where
93 See, e.g., Morrison v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Md. 1970).
See, e.g., Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1979); Villines v. Harris,
487 F. Supp. 1278, 1280-81 (D.N.J. 1980); Bostic v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.W. Va.
1979).
-- 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980) provides that the "court shall, on motion of the
Secretary made before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further
action by the Secretary." Such an order by the court might not be published if it is only for
a computation of benefits, because the Secretary in effect would be conceding the case. Cf.
Morrison v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Md. 1970) (remand to allow Secretary to ob-
tain additional evidence).
96 See, e.g., Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1979); Estes v. Harris,
512 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Johnson v. Harris, 512 F. Supp. 339, 343 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); Bostic v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1979).
Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980). The court in
Alameda found a brief often "essential in complicated medical and technical social security
cases," id. at 1046, but concluded that the reviewing court may rely on the plaintiff's brief
where none has been submitted by the Secretary, describing the problem as the "predica-
ment of flying on one wing," id. at 1049.
98 Bostic v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1979).
99 Id. at 688.
100 Id. at 688-89 (motion to file answer out of time denied because there was no good
reason for delay; default judgment granted after review of the record for evidence support-
ing the Secretary). See Howard v. Weinberger, 489 F.2d 217, 217 (5th Cir. 1974) (granting
motion to file answer out of time when transcript also to be filed late).
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the Secretary filed an answer and transcript but was late in filing
the required memorandum in support of his position' 0 1-is inap-
propriate. The interests cited by the court 02 might be persuasive
to a legislature, but a court's standard of review is governed by
section 405(g). Moreover, the court's analogy to the rule 37 discov-
ery sanction cases 03 is inapposite. When the plaintiff sues the gov-
ernment in an ordinary civil case, his preparations can be ham-
pered if the government refuses to obey discovery orders. In the
Social Security context, however, the claimant may in fact benefit
from the Secretary's failure to fie a brief because such a brief
would direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sup-
porting his decision. Although the reviewing court must examine
the record for substantial evidence, without the Secretary's brief it
may be more influenced by the claimant's emphasis on the lack of
substantial evidence in the record. Applying a standard of "relaxed
review" is thus not only contrary to the statute, but unnecessary
from the claimant's perspective.
3. Administrative record unavailable but Secretary intends
to defend. Where the Secretary indicates an intention to defend by
filing for an extension of time or contesting the claimant's motion
for a default judgment, but is in default in filing a transcript of the
administrative record, the court is faced with a dilemma. It can
penalize the government by permitting the claimant to establish
his claim, thus bypassing the command of section 405(g), or it can
grant the Secretary extensions of time, thus abiding by section
405(g) but indefinitely prolonging a final decision. This comment
has demonstrated that the latter approach is required by the So-
cial Security Act as it currently stands.
The court might be able to compel production by issuing a
writ of mandamus to the Secretary, subject to fine and contempt
sanctions.10 4 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted section
405(h) to preclude review by the district courts under federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, °10  the question of mandamus jurisdiction °6 re-
101 Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (1st Cir. 1980).
102 Id. at 1047. See supra note 60.
103 622 F.2d at 1048 n.4.
10 The main requirements for mandamus are "the existence of a clear right in the
plaintiff to demand the performance by the defendant of a plainly defined, peremptory, and
ministerial duty, and the lack of an adequate remedy other than mandamus." Vishnevsky v.
United States, 581 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 168-69 (1803); Schulke v. United States, 544 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1976).
106 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-57 (1975). See supra note 26.
,o 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or
1982]
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mains open.10 7 Another appropriate basis for a mandamus order is
the All Writs Act.108 The court could take jurisdiction under sec-
tion 405(g) 0 9 and, in accordance with the All Writs Act, issue a
writ "necessary or appropriate"1 in aid of its jurisdiction. Use of
mandamus is consistent with section 405(g)'s standard of review,
but allows the court to compel the Secretary to file a certified copy
of the transcript, without which the court cannot proceed.
Mandamus may be a realistic solution to part of the problem,
but in practice it has significant limitations. The Secretary will
tend to focus his resources on those cases in which the writ is is-
sued, 11 resulting in an inequitable and unplanned allocation of re-
any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.").
107 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court held that jurisdiction was
proper under section 405(g), and therefore did not consider the plaintiff's contention that
mandamus jurisdiction was also proper. Id. at 332 n.12. Several lower courts have relied on
mandamus jurisdiction in the Social Security context. See, e.g., Elliott v. Weinberger, 564
F.2d 1219, 1227 & nn. 11-12 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding jurisdiction under section 1361 to
review denial of hearing before recoupment), modified sub nom. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682 (1979) (finding jurisdiction under section 405(g) without discussing section 1361);
DeLao v. Califano, 560 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1977) (section 1361 provides alternate basis
for jurisdiction in class action challenging termination of benefits without prior hearing);
White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1977) (section 1361 jurisdiction to issue order
compelling reduction in unreasonable administrative delays), cert. denied sub nom. Califano
v. White, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222, 1230-31 (D.D.C.
1979) (dictum) (court can take jurisdiction under section 1361 in class action for delay in
administrative hearings); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (sec-
tion 1361 is one basis for jurisdiction over class action challenging termination of benefits
without notice and hearing). Cf. Alameda v. Secretary of HEW, 622 F.2d 1044, 1049 n.5 (1st
Cir. 1980) (mandamus question not decided); Poe v. Mathews, 572 F.2d 137, 138 (6th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (same); Villines v. Harris, 487 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D.N.J. 1980) (same).
108 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) provides:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court
which has jurisdiction.
10 The All Writs Act does not independently provide jurisdiction. See United States v.
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977) ("This Court has repeatedly recognized the
power of a federal court to issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be neces-
sary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously
issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained. . . ."); ITT Community Dev. Corp.
v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The authority of a district court to invoke
the extraordinary powers conferred by the All Writs Act ... assumes ... the presence of
an independent source of subject matter jurisdiction . . ").
110 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). The All Writs Act may be applied "flexibly" and in a way
calculated to achieve the "ends of justice." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 173 (1977) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942)).
"1 For a discussion of these concerns in the context of private rights of initiation, see
Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HAIv. L. REv. 1193, 1267-71
(1982).
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sources. Moreover, mandamus traditionally has been granted only
when there is a "'clear right' in the plaintiff to the relief sought
and a 'clear duty' on the part of the defendant to do the act in
question. ' 112 Although the Secretary's duty to file a certified copy
of the transcript with his answer within the time provided by the
federal rules is clearly defined, in some cases it will be impossible
to comply: the record may be lost, inaudible, or otherwise impossi-
ble to transcribe. 13 In such cases, the court must accept the delay
and remand for another administrative hearing. 114
III. A PROPOSED LEGISLATI RESPONSE
Where the Secretary indicates an intent to defend but is in
default in submitting the administrative record, serious inequities
result; many deserving claimants experience lengthy delays before
receiving the benefits due them under the Act.11 5 Congressional ac-
tion is needed to increase claims-administration appropriations
and to balance more equitably the consideration courts must give
to the Secretary's administrative problems and to claimants' rights
to prompt resolution of their eligibility status.
Congress should authorize the claimants to challenge the Sec-
retary's delay. Where the Secretary fails to file the transcript of
the administrative record within the time allowed for filing the an-
swer, he should be required to show a good faith effort to produce
the record. If his delay is not in good faith, the court should be
authorized to institute interim payment of benefits to the
claimant.
The definition of "good faith" would depend on Congress's
balancing of the policies favoring each of the two parties. 1   A
"' Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (quoting Burnett v.
Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973)).
11 See, e.g., Steward v. Harris, 509 F. Supp. 31, 33 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (remand because
record inadequate and "liberally sprinkled with 'inaudibles' when plaintiff is speaking");
Smith v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 898, 899 (D.D.C. 1978) (remand because portion of the
administrative record had been lost).
114 The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 307, 94
Stat. 441, 458, amended section 405(g) to allow the Secretary to remand a case for good
cause before an answer is filed. "Good cause," according to the Conference Report, would
include a lost or inaudible record, or other record that could not be transcribed. The confer-
ees stated, however, "that remands on the basis of these breakdowns in the administrative
process should be kept to a minimum so that persons appealing their decision are not un-
duly burdened by the resulting delay." H.R. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980).
15 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
J" Congress could adopt a good faith standard that would be left undefined in the stat-
ute. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) (Bankruptcy Code permits courts to
confirm a reorganization plan if plan was proposed in "good faith and not by any means
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broad definition of good faith, for example, would consider the
Secretary's lack of resources; 117 it might also excuse failure to pro-
duce the transcript if the record is lost or inaudible.1"8 A narrow
definition of good faith, on the other hand, would preclude the
lack-of-resources defense; it would indicate a greater willingness to
make payments to potentially ineligible claimants in exchange for
speedier payments in general.
Under present law, payments to a claimant ultimately found
to be ineligible are "overpayments"; 9 recoupment of overpay-
ments is prohibited where a recipient is not at fault and where it
would defeat the purposes of the Social Security Act or "would be
against equity or good conscience." 20 The desirability of extending
this rule to the interim payments ordered by a court when the Sec-
retary has in bad faith delayed filing the record depends on how
the good faith standard is defined. If good faith is narrowly de-
fined, a greater number of possibly ineligible claimants would re-
ceive interim benefits, and the recoupment standard should be re-
laxed to allow the largest recovery possible from claimants
ultimately found ineligible. 12 1
forbidden by law"); 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1976) (defining "good faith" in context of automo-
bile dealer suits against manufacturers as "duty... to act in a fair and equitable manner").
See also the cases considering delays in granting hearings under section 205(b) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976): Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978);
White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Califano v. White, 435
U.S. 908 (1978); Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 1979). These courts held
that the statutory command to provide a claimant with a "reasonable ... opportunity for a
hearing," 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), was violated when the delay exceeded a specific amount of
time. Contra Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1979).
117 For cases on delay in holding administrative hearings, compare Wright v. Califano,
587 F.2d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 1979) ("legislatively imposed 'reasonable dispatch' duty must be
judged in the light of the resources that Congress has supplied to the agency for the exercise
of its functions") with Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1978) (inadequate re-
sources do not bar vindication of legal rights); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir.
1977) (rejecting Secretary's claim that delays were reasonable because of inadequate re-
sources), cert. denied sub nom. Califano v. White, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); and Cockrum v.
Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222, 1239 (D.D.C. 1979) (inadequacy of funding goes "to the form of
relief, not to the issue of entitlement to relief").
11" See supra note 113.
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 404.501 (1981).
120 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976) ("In any case in which more than the correct amount of
payment has been made, there shall be no... recovery by the United States from[] any
person who is without fault if such ... recovery would defeat the purpose of this sub-
chapter or would be against equity and good conscience.").
20 But see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting
that recoupment from ineligible recipients is highly improbable given the "judgment-proof"
nature of welfare claimants).
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CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that section 405(g) defines the ex-
clusive standard of review for denial of Social Security benefits:
review of the record for substantial evidence supporting the Secre-
tary. A relaxed standard of review under rule 55(e) or by analogy
to rule 37 in situations of default violates the exclusivity mandated
by the Social Security Act.
The frequent inequity of this standard cannot be denied. Al-
though a mandamus proceeding is consistent with the statutory
framework and offers an opportunity for occasional relief, legisla-
tive action is needed to balance more equitably a claimant's need
for a speedy appeal and the government's interest in avoiding pay-
ments to ineligible claimants. Interim payment of benefits to
claimants when the Secretary in bad faith delays filing the admin-
istrative record, coupled with a relaxed standard for recoupment of
benefits to individuals eventually found to be ineligible, offers a
workable solution in at least the most egregious cases.
Julie Fritts Kaptur
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